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Abstract
This thesis discusses the development and evaluation of an airborne collision alerting
logic for aircraft on closely-spaced approaches to parallel runways. A novel methodology
is used which links alerts to collision probabilities: alerting thresholds are set such that
when the probability of a collision exceeds an acceptable hazard level an alert is issued.
The logic was designed to limit the hazard level to that estimated for the Precision
Runway Monitor system: one accident in every one thousand blunders which trigger
alerts. When the aircraft were constrained to be coaltitude, evaluations of a two-
dimensional version of the alerting logic show that the achieved hazard level is
approximately one accident in every 250 blunders. Problematic scenarios have been
identified and corrections to the logic can be made.
The evaluations also show that over eighty percent of all unnecessary alerts were issued
during scenarios in which the miss distance would have been less than 1000 ft, indicating
that the alerts may have been justified. Also, no unnecessary alerts were generated during
normal approaches.
Modifications to the two-dimensional logic were made in order to expand the situations
under which the logic could operate effectively. Two altitude criteria were added to the
logic, and the performance of these three-dimensional versions was compared to the two-
dimensional version. Under three-dimensional parallel approaches, unnecessary alerts
were reduced by almost forty percent, and the collision rate remained constant.
Finally, the effect of incorporating several avoidance maneuver options was investigated.
When the logic could select one of two maneuvers, the performance remained virtually
unchanged when compared to the single maneuver logic.
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Nomenclature
g : Gravitational constant.
h : Altitude of the intruder relative to the own aircraft; a positive value indicates that
the intruder is above the own aircraft.
hav : Predicted altitude separation assuming own aircraft initiates an avoidance maneu-
ver.
hnorm : Predicted altitude separation assuming own aircraft continues normal approach.
1int : Climb rate of the intruder; a positive value indicates that the intruder is climbing.
hown : Climb rate of the own aircraft; a positive value indicates that the own aircraft is
climbing.
N : Total number of simulations.
P(C I trajectory) : Probability of a collision given that the own aircraft follows the flight
path designated by trajectory.
R : Intruder's turn radius; the quantity is always positive.
R: Range limit; parameter calculated within the alerting logic which corresponds to
the point along the collision curve at which P(C I maneuver) is equal to a threshold
probability level.
tc : Time to collision parameter; the quantity is always positive.
Vin t : Airspeed of the intruder.
Vown : Airspeed of the own aircraft.
x : Lateral distance between the intruder and the own aircraft's runway centerline; the
quantity is positive when the intruder has not crossed the own aircraft's runway
centerline.
X: State vector: (x, y, h, , , Vin t, t,int Vown, lown)
y : Longitudinal position of the intruder relative to the own aircraft; a positive value
indicates that the intruder is ahead of the own aircraft.
ycurve : Longitudinal component of collision curve; calculated within the alerting logic and
is the point on the collision curve corresponding to the intruder's lateral position.
S: Bank angle of the intruder; a positive value indicates a turn toward the own air-
craft's runway centerline.
o: Standard deviation of a Gaussian error distribution.
W: Heading of the intruder relative to the runway heading; a positive value indicates
that the intruder will intercept the own aircraft's runway centerline.
Intruder's rate of heading change; a positive value indicates that y will increase.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The goal of any alerting system is to provide protection from dangerous incidents. Ideally,
an alerting system issues alerts only when such an incident is imminent, and will refrain
from issuing unnecessary alerts in all other situations. Because of uncertainties within the
physical system, it is not possible to eliminate unnecessary alerts. Therefore, the best pos-
sible alerting system optimizes the timing of alerts in order to maintain an acceptable level
of safety while minimizing unnecessary alerts. Such a system issues alerts when just
enough time remains to safely resolve a predicted conflict. Issuing alerts later decreases
the amount of time available for the conflict to be avoided, and thus prevents the system
from effectively providing the prescribed safety level. Issuing alerts sooner tends to
increase the unnecessary alert rate.
The focus of this thesis is the development of an alerting logic which attempts to oper-
ate in this optimal fashion. The logic is specifically designed to operate during indepen-
dent simultaneous parallel approaches to landing. It is based on probability concepts:
alerts are issued only when the probability of a collision between the two aircraft involved
reaches some threshold value.
This chapter describes the parallel approach situation and discusses the challenges of
alerting under such conditions. One alerting system for parallel approach operations has
already been designed and implemented. The operation of this system, the Precision Run-
way Monitor (PRM), is outlined, and some of its limitations are discussed.
1.1 Parallel Approach
Simultaneous parallel approaches involve two streams of aircraft approaching parallel
runways. In visual meteorological conditions (VMC), the pilots may accept the responsi-
bility of maintaining separation between their aircraft by visual means. For approaches
conducted during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), air traffic control person-
nel are responsible for separation between the aircraft [1].
The relative positions of the aircraft in parallel streams are either dependent or inde-
pendent. In both cases in-trail separation is dictated by wake vortex considerations. Dur-
ing dependent approaches, aircraft are separated diagonally by at least 1.5 or 2.0 miles,
depending on runway separation (Figure 1.1). During independent approaches, the diago-
nal separation restriction is lifted. However, during the turn onto the localizer, at least 3
miles radar separation or 1000 ft altitude separation must be maintained [1].
Diagonal Separation
---------- +t
- In-Trail Separation
Figure 1.1: Aircraft separations during parallel approach
A diagram of a typical parallel approach scenario is shown in Figure 1.2. After the
turn onto the localizer, both aircraft maintain altitude until intercepting the glideslope, at
which time they begin a 30 descent to the runway threshold. During the descent, the air-
craft trajectories may lie exactly side-by-side, or may be offset in altitude somewhat due to
the staggering of the runways.
Required Altitude
Glideslope Separation
Capture \-
r 1000 ft
Runway - - -
Thresholds
3 glideslope
---- ----
Runway Turn Onto
Spacing Localizer
Y. j<300Runway
Stagger
Figure 1.2: Typical parallel approach scenario
The FAA allows independent parallel approaches to be carried out in VMC with a run-
way separation minimum of 700 ft. In IMC, independent approaches may be conducted to
runways spaced at least 4300 ft apart. This minimum is reduced to 3400 ft if the airport is
equipped with the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system [2].
A study performed by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group predicts significant
increases in the number of operations per hour if dependent approaches can be replaced by
independent approaches [2]. At a single airport, a 27% increase in the number of opera-
tions per hour can be expected. Because of the capacity increases to be gained, it is desir-
able to reduce the minimum runway separation required for independent approaches.
1.2 Alerting During Parallel Approach
Aircraft are more closely spaced during parallel approach than during any other phase of
flight. The potential exists for an aircraft in either stream to deviate off course toward
another aircraft in the parallel stream. To increase safety, an alerting system is needed to
warn flight crews of these blundering aircraft. The goal of the alerting system is to insure
adequate separation between aircraft while allowing parallel approaches to be carried out.
The timing of alerts issued by the system is critical. For safety reasons, they should
not be issued too late. If a late alert occurs, there may not be enough time for one aircraft
to evade the other. On the other hand, early alerts increase the rate of unnecessary alerts.
Unnecessary alerts during this phase of flight cause approaches to be aborted without jus-
tification. Aborted approaches disrupt the flow of traffic around the airport and potentially
create hazardous situations during go-around procedures. Therefore, the alerting system
should balance this trade-off and should ideally issue an alert with just enough time to
safely avoid a collision.
To optimize the timing of alerts, the alerting thresholds within the system should be
dependent on the particular situation. When the closure rate between two aircraft is high,
the threshold should encompass enough time or space to permit the threatened aircraft to
escape safely. If instead the closure rate is low but the threshold does not change, greater
potential for an unnecessary alert exists. Therefore, the alerting threshold should be
smaller, in a spatial sense, for low closure rates and larger for high rates.
For example, the scenario in Figure 1.3 shows one aircraft changing its heading
toward another. In the left half of the figure, the circle surrounding aircraft B indicates a
possible alerting threshold in this situation. Aircraft A is following the normal approach
course with a minimal bank angle and a negligible heading deviation away from the run-
way heading. If A were to enter the circle in the same attitude, aircraft B would have just
enough time to initiate a maneuver and avoid a collision.
II III I I I
New
Alerting
Threshold
S Alerting
Threshold
Figure 1.3: Example alerting threshold changing in response to
state information
In the configuration on the right of Figure 1.3, A has altered its heading and bank
angle. The threshold around B has grown larger in response to the change in the other air-
craft's attitude. The amount of time needed for B to successfully avoid aircraft A, with its
new attitude, has increased, and thus the threshold has increased in size.
1.3 The Precision Runway Monitor
The Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) is a system designed to resolve dangerous situa-
tions which may occur between two aircraft on simultaneous parallel approaches. This
system issues alerts when an aircraft deviates into a No Transgression Zone between the
two runways.
Figure 1.4 shows the basic configuration of the PRM system. To perform simulta-
neous approaches in IMC using PRM, the runways must be spaced at least 3400 ft apart
[2]. A 2000-ft wide No Transgression Zone (NTZ) is centered between the two runways.
The alerting threshold of this system is the boundary of the NTZ. Penetration of this zone
by one of the aircraft prompts a breakout instruction to the other aircraft from a ground
controller [3].
3400 ft
2000 ft
No
Transgression
Zone
(NTZ)
Figure 1.4: PRM operating configuration
PRM uses a radar system with a 2.4-second update interval or better to allow ground
controllers to monitor the positions of the two approaching aircraft with respect to the
NTZ. The aircraft, NTZ, and runway centerlines are displayed on a high resolution color
monitor. The lateral scale of the display may be adjusted to allow greater resolution of the
aircrafts' lateral positions. Also, the display can be modified to include a predicted future
trajectory ranging from two to ten seconds in length [3].
The system's predictive capability is used to prepare controllers for possible alerting
situations. The deviating aircraft's icon changes from green to yellow and an aural 'Cau-
tion!' alert sounds when the system predicts NTZ penetration in ten seconds. Upon NTZ
penetration, the blundering aircraft's icon changes from yellow to red and an aural 'Warn-
ing!' alert sounds. These measures help controllers to detect blunders and issue alerts
promptly [3].
Even with the predictive capabilities of the system, only the blundering aircraft's lat-
eral position is taken into account when an alert is issued to the pilot of the threatened air-
craft. Other factors, including longitudinal separation of the two aircraft and the closure
rate of the blundering aircraft, are not considered. Figure 1.5 illustrates the major compo-
nents of the PRM alerting process.
Aircraft on
parallel approach
PRM Radar
Controller's Monitor
2.4 s update rate
A
Monitoring VHF Link
Controller
Figure 1.5: PRM alerting process
The major limitation inherent in the operation of this system is the amount of time
which might elapse between when the NTZ is penetrated and when the breakout maneuver
is actually initiated. The controller must first detect that one of the aircraft has entered the
NTZ. At this point the controller clears the local control frequency and issues a verbal
breakout instruction to the endangered aircraft. The pilot then initiates the commanded
avoidance maneuver. After the avoidance maneuver has begun, air traffic control resumes
authority over subsequent traffic management.
Several experimental measurements of the controller's response time delay have been
made. One or two radar updates may occur before the controller decides that an alert is
necessary. Analysis by Shank et al. indicates that the time delay between NTZ penetration
and controller response is over five seconds in over twenty percent of the experimental sit-
uations involving the severest blunder trajectories [4]. When clearing the radio channel,
the controller may be forced to wait until the pilot finishes a communication. Recordings
made of terminal area communications indicate that the controller will be able to transmit
without delay with a probability of over 0.93, but the maximum wait may be over eight
seconds [4].
The pilot's response time is difficult to determine experimentally. The pilot may
already consider the parallel approach situation a dangerous one and may be ready to
begin the avoidance maneuver almost immediately. However, it is possible that a pilot
may receive only one breakout instruction in the course of his or her career and may take
several seconds to begin the maneuver.
When the controller's and pilot's response delays are combined, the possible time
delays involved in the alerting process place significant limitations on the runway separa-
tions for which PRM provides an adequate level of safety. The NTZ acts as a buffer zone
which allows alerts to be issued with adequate time to resolve the conflict safely even
when time delays are present. If the size of the NTZ were to remain the same as runway
separation is reduced, more unnecessary alerts would result as normal lateral deviations
off the runway centerline place the aircraft within the NTZ. Alternatively, if the NTZ is
reduced in size with runway separation, the time delays inherent in the alerting process
will limit the system's ability to provide adequate protection. Therefore, the runway sepa-
rations for which PRM can provide a high level of safety are limited by the time delays
associated with the alerting process [5].
To reduce the minimum runway separation below the PRM minimum, the ground-
based alerting system should be replaced with an airborne one. The airborne system elim-
inates the controller and radio communications from the loop, reducing the time delays
within the alerting process. To implement an airborne system, the two aircraft involved
each broadcast their location and other state information. From this information, an air-
borne alerting system could determine when the other aircraft posed a threat and could
issue an alert at that time. The only time delay remaining in the system involves the
amount of time the pilot takes to react to the alert and the subsequent dynamic response of
the aircraft.
1.4 Probability Thresholds versus PRM Thresholds
In the PRM system the alerting threshold is fixed in space and constant over time, regard-
less of the relative positions or closure rates of the two aircraft involved. A more effective
alerting system would define alerting thresholds relative to the aircraft to be protected, and
would alter the threshold geometry based on changes in the aircrafts' states. Errors in the
measurement of these states, as well as uncertainty about what each aircraft will do, make
it difficult to simultaneously eliminate collisions and unnecessary alerts.
A probability-based logic allows the number of unnecessary alerts and collisions to be
managed in terms of the probability that each will occur. The logic functions using a pre-
diction of the intruder's future trajectory. If a collision is predicted to occur with some
level of probability, the system issues an alert. Therefore, the alerting thresholds can be
designed by lowering the probability of a collision until the probability of an unnecessary
alert rises to a level that is no longer acceptable. The trade-off between unnecessary alerts
and system safety is discussed in work by Kuchar [6].
To determine whether a collision is likely, the system must have the ability to predict
the future trajectories of the two aircraft involved. To be accurate, such a system requires
more real-time state information from both aircraft than the single lateral deviation mea-
surement required for the PRM system. Acquiring the measurements needed to predict
future trajectories is feasible using a system such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast (ADS-B) which broadcasts current state information and GPS position mea-
surements.
PRM and a probability-based alerting system will generally issue alerts at different
times (Figure 1.6). An intruder at location A warrants an alert under the PRM system even
though the probability of a collision is very low. Because aircraft A is far ahead of the own
aircraft, A must dramatically increase its bank angle or reduce airspeed in order to cause a
collision. Even though the aircraft is blundering, the probability-based system does not
issue an alert because the probability of a collision is not above the threshold.
Meanwhile, an intruder at B triggers an alert from the probability-based system before
prompting an alert from the PRM system. The probability-based system predicts that air-
craft B will cause a collision with some level of probability. The alert is issued from the
probability-based system sooner than from PRM because the intruder's high closure rate
is not taken into account within PRM. The design of such a probability-based alerting
system is the focus of this thesis.
Threatened Intruder's
Aircraft's PRM Threshold Runway
Runway
Probability Threshold
Figure 1.6: Example PRM threshold and probability threshold
1.5 Level of Safety
The safety level provided by the alerting system is defined to be the probability that an
incident is successfully resolved during a parallel approach in which a blunder occurs.
Hazard level is defined as the probability that an accident is left unresolved by the alerting
system. By definition, the sum of safety level and hazard level is unity since all incidents
are either resolved or unresolved.
A study by the Precision Runway Monitor Program Office assessed the safety level
provided by the PRM system [3]. The report defines a worst-case blunder as a 300 head-
ing change toward the other aircraft's runway centerline. The study estimates that PRM
allows only one accident in every 250 worst-case blunders, implying that PRM provides a
safety level of 249/250 or has a hazard level of 1/250 (0.004). As a baseline, it follows
that other parallel approach alerting systems should provide a similar level of safety.
In the probability-based alerting logic, alerting thresholds are designed such that the
system does not exceed a predefined hazard level. The alerting logic uses real-time state
measurements to determine if the intruder is blundering and poses a threat. When those
state measurements indicate that the probability of a collision exceeds an acceptable level,
an alert is issued. This threshold collision probability corresponds to the hazard level
defined above (unresolved incidents per intruder blunder). Therefore, the probability-
based alerting logic is designed such that the hazard level (probability of a collision during
a scenario in which a blunder occurs) approximates the PRM hazard level of 0.004.
It is important to realize that the hazard level associated with either PRM or the proba-
bility-based alerting logic is not the overall hazard level within the parallel approach situ-
ation. The overall hazard level of parallel approaches is defined as the probability of an
accident occurring during a parallel approach situation. This statistic is related to the
number of blunders which occur, as well as the ability of the alerting system to resolve
those blunders. The following equation states this concept numerically:
Overall Hazard Level = P(C) = P(C I B) -P(B) (1.1)
where P(C) is the probability of a collision, P(B) is the probability of a blunder, and P(C I
B) is the probability of a collision given that a blunder occurs. For instance, a study by the
Precision Runway Monitor Program Office estimates that only one blunder will occur dur-
ing every twenty-five million parallel approaches [3]. The overall hazard level is then
given by:
1 accident 1 blunder 1 accident
250 blunders 25 million approaches = 6.25 billion approaches
This thesis focuses on designing and testing a probability-based alerting system based on
the hazard level, defined by P(C I B).
1.6 Thesis Roadmap
The remainder of this thesis discusses the methodology used to develop a probability-
based alerting logic and the performance of several versions of the logic. Chapter 2 pre-
sents the basic methodology used to develop the first version of the logic. This first ver-
sion is based on two-dimensional parallel approach geometries. The alerting logic which
was produced using this methodology is presented in Chapter 3. An evaluation of the
logic's performance under two-dimensional approaches is presented in Chapter 4.
Next, the altitude restriction is lifted and modifications are made to the two-dimen-
sional logic in an effort to improve the performance of the alerting logic under three-
dimensional geometries. The development of the three-dimensional logic and the results
of a series of performance evaluations appear in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses general
issues associated with alerting under three-dimensional parallel approach geometries.
Chapter 7 summarizes the work and presents the significant conclusions.
28
Chapter 2
Probability Threshold Design Methodology
Alerting when the probability of a collision reaches some threshold value allows the sys-
tem to be designed to provide a consistent level of safety. This chapter outlines the steps
taken to develop the logic for such a system operating specifically under parallel approach
conditions. First, a model of the parallel approach situation is developed which defines
important variables and presents assumptions. Next, the required state measurements and
associated measurement accuracies are outlined. The use of Monte Carlo simulation tech-
niques to estimate the probability of a collision is explained in detail, and some represen-
tative results are included. This chapter also presents the process by which the alerting
thresholds are defined based on the calculated values of collision probability.
2.1 The Parallel Approach Situation
To simplify the initial development, the focus is on the final approach segment; thus only
the straight, descent portion of the approach is considered. Notably, runway stagger and
the turn onto the localizer, including the required altitude separation, are ignored. Also,
post-alert procedures to be managed by air traffic control are not considered in the devel-
opment of the logic.
Throughout this thesis one aircraft is designated the threatened aircraft or "own air-
craft". This aircraft is equipped with the alerting system and performs an avoidance
maneuver in response to an alert. The other aircraft is termed the intruder. It is assumed
that the intruder does not respond to the threatened aircraft.
The intruder's position is defined relative to the origin of a set of axes placed on the
own aircraft's runway centerline (Figure 2.1). To derive this origin, the own aircraft's lon-
gitudinal distance from the runway threshold is projected onto the runway centerline. It is
assumed that the runway centerline is the own aircraft's intended path and that any devia-
tion from that path will be corrected. Figure 2.1 also defines other important variables. To
simplify subsequent figures, the threatened aircraft always appears at the origin of the
coordinate axes throughout this text.
I I
Relative
Longitudinal
Position
Turn Radius
Vown IntruderY - -------------------- -- ----
Own Aircraft Relative
- Lateral
x Position
Figure 2.1: Intruder position defined relative to own aircraft
In the figure above, the following six variables appear:
* Lateral distance from the intruder to the own aircraft's runway centerline, x
* Longitudinal position of the intruder relative to the own aircraft, y
* Airspeed of the intruder, Vint
* Heading of the intruder relative to the runway heading, xy
* Bank angle of the intruder, 0
* Airspeed of the own aircraft, Vown
For simplicity, the following variables are not shown in the drawing but are important:
* Altitude of the intruder relative to the own aircraft, h
* Climb rate of the intruder, hint
* Climb rate of the own aircraft, hown
The combination of all these measurements describes the state vector:
X= (x, y, h, V, 0, Vint, hint, Vown , own )
Measurements of the variables which comprise X are assumed to be available to the own
aircraft through ADS-B or through measurement filtering techniques.
2.2 Measurement Requirements and Accuracy Estimates
The next step in the development of the alerting logic requires identifying the set of state
measurements that are vital to the effective performance of the alerting system. Also, the
development of such a system requires an estimate of the expected accuracy of state mea-
surements.
Because alerts are issued when a collision is predicted to occur with some level of
probability, the successful operation of a probability-based system relies on its ability to
accurately predict future conditions. Therefore, it is important to obtain measurements of
the initial conditions and formulate an accurate prediction based on this information. The
nine variables defined above describe an initial state vector, X, from which the alerting
logic extrapolates the future trajectories. The logic assumes that the own aircraft follows
the runway centerline at a speed of Vown while the intruder performs a constant-rate turn
defined by the measurements within the initial state vector.
The relative lateral and longitudinal positions, as well as the heading angle, provide a
starting point for predicting the intruder's turn. The intruder's bank angle and airspeed
imply a rate of heading change. Without a measurement of bank angle, it is more difficult
to estimate turn rate. The own aircraft's current speed enables the logic to predict its
approximate future location, assuming that the aircraft tracks the runway centerline at that
speed. The own aircraft's climb rate and the intruder's relative altitude and climb rate
allow the future relative altitude to be estimated.
As the alerting thresholds are developed, estimates must be made as to the accuracy of
the state measurements by describing potential errors. Estimating error involves defining
error distributions using probability density functions. A state error estimate is made
based on the expected accuracy of the sensor and the noise in that state due to turbulence
acting on the aircraft. Also, uncertainty about how future maneuvers may cause the actual
trajectory to disagree with the predicted path are incorporated into the state measurement
error estimate.
2.3 Methodology
Recall that the PRM hazard level was estimated to be one accident in every 250 blunders
(0.004). As a baseline, the probability-based system is designed such that its hazard level
is similar to PRM's: one accident in every one thousand blunders (0.001). The alerting
threshold is set at those points where the own aircraft will be unable to safely escape from
the collision in a maximum of one case in every one thousand. Therefore, alerts are issued
when the probability of a collision after an alert exceeds the maximum acceptable hazard
level. The notation P(C I maneuver) 1 corresponds to the probability of interest. Note that
P(C I maneuver) is a function of the avoidance maneuver and is an implicit function of the
situation defined by X.
The alerting thresholds are based on knowledge of P(C I maneuver). However, calcu-
lation of P(C I maneuver) cannot be done in real-time, so calculations must be made off-
line and stored for future use. Notably, P(C I maneuver) can be determined for every X
1. "probability of a collision given a maneuver"
which is likely to occur during a parallel approach situation. Then, an estimate of P(C I
maneuver) associated with that set of state measurements can be stored for future use, or a
subset of state information which defines a physical alerting threshold can be stored. In
this way, the alerting thresholds can be used while state measurements are taken in real-
time.
2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
Monte Carlo simulations can be used to estimate event probabilities for complex situa-
tions in which uncertainty exists [7]. In order to use Monte Carlo techniques, a set of ini-
tial information must be supplied, along with estimates about the accuracy of such
information. Also required is a model of the situation dynamics which describes how the
situation will change in the future.
For the development of the probability-based alerting logic, Monte Carlo simulations
were used to calculate the value of P(C I maneuver) over a range of state measurements.
The points at which P(C I maneuver) equals the maximum acceptable hazard level then
define the alerting threshold for the system. Figure 2.2 depicts the development and ulti-
mate operation of this system.
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Figure 2.2: Schematic of alerting system operation
Monte Carlo techniques can be used to calculate the probability of a collision associ-
ated with a nominal situation defined by X: the intruder's and own aircraft's initial states.
Before a simulation begins, measurement errors are added to the nominal states, creating a
set of actual states associated with the nominal states. Next, the own aircraft and intruder
are simulated together starting from their actual initial states and using the constraints on
situation dynamics over the course of the simulation. For the development of the alerting
logic, the intruder is assumed to perform a constant-rate turn while the own aircraft per-
forms a prescribed avoidance maneuver.
In order to derive P(C I maneuver) using this process, a large number of simulations
are run with randomly generated errors introduced to the nominal intruder states. Because
of the errors introduced at the beginning of each simulation, each actual intruder trajectory
differs somewhat from the nominal trajectory (Figure 2.3). This emulates the wide range
of trajectories which are possible when uncertainties are present within the real system.
Collision? Nominal Trajectory
Intruder's
Actual States:N, (x+x, y+y,
Actual Trajectories (x+Ax, +Ay,...)
Intruder's Nominal
Initial States:
(x,y,h,V, 0,Vint ,hnt)
(Vown,hown)
Figure 2.3: Nominal versus actual intruder trajectories in Monte
Carlo simulations
By counting the number of collisions which occur during N simulations based on a set
of nominal states, an estimate of collision probability associated with the nominal state
measurements can be made. The following formula is used to calculate the probability of
a collision assuming that the own aircraft follows an avoidance maneuver:
Number of collisionsP(C I maneuver) = (2.1)N
The magnitude of P(C I maneuver) to be calculated and the desired accuracy of that
calculation determine the number of simulations that need to be run. The following for-
mula dictates the minimum number of simulations which must be run in order to calculate
a certain level of probability, P, with a level of uncertainty defined by a standard deviation,
G.
P (1-P)N = P )  (2.2)
For example, if a probability of 0.001 is calculated over 10,000 simulations, then one stan-
dard deviation of error has a magnitude of 0.0003.
Instead of calculating P(C I maneuver) at each possible X, Monte Carlo techniques
were used to estimate collision probabilities for a limited set of nominal parallel approach
situations. By choosing a range of situations to comprise the set, the calculation of colli-
sion probability in an arbitrary situation can then be performed by interpolation.
2.5 Monte Carlo Results
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations can be best understood by creating contour
plots of the resulting probability calculations. A representative plot is shown in Figure
2.4. Each plot combines probability information for the entire x-y plane and for one com-
bination of intruder heading, bank angle and airspeed. The relative altitude of the intruder
and the climb rates of both aircraft are assumed to be zero. Darker shades are associated
with higher probabilities of collision, where a collision is defined to occur when the dis-
tance between the two aircraft falls below 500 ft.
P=0.0005
Figure 2.4: Typical Monte Carlo results: P(C I maneuver)
The plot in Figure 2.4 depicts the results of Monte Carlo simulations assuming that the
own aircraft performed an avoidance maneuver. Specifically, the own aircraft turns and
climbs after a response time delay, and the intruder carries out a constant-rate turn at con-
stant altitude as dictated by its initial states. As the intruder's lateral distance from the
own aircraft increases, the intruder is less likely to cause a collision because the own air-
craft has more time to climb away from the intruder's altitude. Also, if the intruder is far
in front or far behind, regardless of lateral separation, a collision is less likely to occur
without a significant change in the intruder's airspeed.
To examine the need for an alert, it is of interest to run the same series of Monte Carlo
simulations assuming that the own aircraft continues the normal approach instead of per-
forming an avoidance maneuver. Again, probability contours over the entire x-y plane
and for one combination of heading, bank angle and airspeed show dangerous regions
(Figure 2.5).
P=0.0005
P=0.001
P=0.002
Figure 2.5: Typical Monte Carlo results: P(C I normal approach)
In this case, the own aircraft remains coaltitude with the intruder throughout the
intruder's blunder. Even as the intruder's lateral distance from the own aircraft increases,
there is a longitudinal position from which the intruder is theoretically able to cause a col-
lision. Therefore, in this theoretical case, the probability contours extend laterally without
limit.
2.6 Incorporation of Design Hazard Level
The maximum acceptable hazard level can be incorporated into the alerting system design
using the Monte Carlo results. As mentioned in Section 1.5, the hazard level implies that
at the time an alert is issued and the avoidance maneuver begins, the probability that an
accident will occur is equal to that hazard level. Since P(C I maneuver) is the probability
that a collision will occur, the alerting threshold should be set along the contour associated
with P(C I maneuver) = hazard level. Figure 2.6 shows an example alerting threshold
established in this way.
y
P(C I maneuver) = hazard level
Figure 2.6: Alerting threshold defined by hazard level
Alerts are issued only when P(C I maneuver) exceeds this hazard level. Thus, an
intruder at A in Figure 2.6 does not warrant an alert even though the lateral separation
between the two aircraft is low. A is far enough in front of the own aircraft such that a col-
lision will only occur in what is assumed to be an unlikely event: A's turn rate increases
significantly. An intruder at B, although projected to collide with the own aircraft if no
maneuver is undertaken, does not trigger an alert because an alert issued later still pro-
vides the target level of safety. Delaying the alert allows the system to collect more infor-
mation about the intruder's projected path, and allows greater opportunity for the intruder
to resume its proper course. The intruder at C triggers an alert: the probability that a col-
lision will occur is greater than the maximum acceptable hazard level if the own aircraft's
avoidance maneuver is initiated at that time.
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Chapter 3
Two-Dimensional Alerting Logic
An alerting system was constructed using the methodology discussed in Chapter 2 and is
described in this chapter. The relevant subset of state measurements and their assumed
uncertainties are defined. The Monte Carlo simulations which were carried out are
described, and representative results are shown. Alerting thresholds constructed based on
the Monte Carlo evaluations are described in detail.
To begin investigating alerting issues for aircraft on parallel approach, altitude consid-
erations were removed: the own aircraft and the intruder are coaltitude. The own air-
craft's avoidance maneuver initiates any altitude differences between the two aircraft.
This restriction simplifies the visualization of alerting thresholds, as well as their storage
and retrieval. Chapter 5 discusses a modification that extends the two-dimensional logic
to the more complex three-dimensional case.
3.1 State Measurements and Error Estimates
For the two-dimensional alerting logic, the intruder is constrained to be coaltitude with the
own aircraft as it follows the approach path. Vertical separation only takes place if and
when the own aircraft begins an avoidance maneuver. Therefore, initial relative altitude
and climb rates are excluded throughout the development of the two-dimensional alerting
logic.
When constrained to a horizontal plane, the intruder's future trajectory can be esti-
mated if the following state measurements are made:
* Relative lateral position, x.
* Relative longitudinal position, y.
* Airspeed, Vin t-
* Heading, AV.
* Bank angle, Q.
If the own aircraft's airspeed, Vown , is included in the set of state measurements, relative
horizontal separation can be predicted at points in the future.
To simplify the problem further, the speed of the own aircraft is assumed to be con-
stant at 145 knots. Also the measurement of the intruder's airspeed is assumed to be exact
and thus will be assigned a deterministic value during each set of simulations. The
remaining four state measurements each have a zero-centered Gaussian error distribution,
defined by a standard deviation, a (Table 3.1). The errors in lateral and longitudinal posi-
tion correspond to measurements which could be attained using Differential GPS (DGPS).
The values for (T and ao allow for aircraft attitude noise inherent in the approach, uncer-
tainties concerning the intruder's future turn rate, and sensor measurement errors. The
final estimates of o, and (T were made based on an examination of aircraft state data from
approach simulations recorded at Rockwell-Collins [8].
Table 3.1: State Measurements and Standard Deviations
State Measurement Standard Deviation
x x = 35 ft
y y = 35 ft
__ a = 2.5'
So = 5.00
3.2 Monte Carlo Simulations and Nominal Intruder States
To encompass a reasonable range of parallel approach geometries, the five intruder states
were systematically varied as shown in Table 3.2. The lateral spacing limit of 4400 ft is
based on the current runway separation minimum of 4300 ft for independent parallel
approaches in IMC. The longitudinal separation limit corresponds to 1.5 nmi--the range
of longitudinal separations which could occur between the intruder and own aircraft based
on minimum in-trail spacing limits of 3 nmi. The intruder airspeeds represent a reason-
able sampling of final approach speeds for a range of aircraft, and the heading and bank
angles are representative of a wide range of possible intruder attitudes. The result is that
P(C I maneuver) must be calculated over (12 -47 -4 - 9 - 7) = 142,128 conditions.
Table 3.2: Range of Nominal Intruder State Measurements
State Range Increments N
x 0 ft - 4400 ft 400 ft 12
y 9200 ft behind - 9200 ft ahead 400 ft 47
Vint  120 knots - 180 knots 20 knots 4
400 away - 400 toward the own aircraft 100 9
200 away - 400 toward the own aircraft 100 7
Before the simulations are run, a collision must be defined. However, the definition of
a collision is somewhat arbitrary. A miss distance of 10 feet between the two aircraft is
technically not a collision since the miss distance is nonzero. However, the pilots
involved may view the situation differently. For this work, a collision is said to occur if
the distance between the centers of gravity of the two aircraft is 500 feet or less. This defi-
nition has been used in other related work [3].
Next, the own aircraft's avoidance maneuver following the alert must be specified.
For the two-dimensional version of the logic, the own aircraft is assumed to be limited to
one maneuver [9]. In this case, the maneuver is defined as a combined turn and climb that
begins after a response time delay of 2 seconds. The climb component entails a 0.25g
pull-up until a climb rate of 2000 ft/min is reached. To perform the turn component, the
aircraft rolls at a rate of 50/s until reaching a 300 bank angle, rolling out at the same rate to
intercept a final heading of 450 away from the intruder's runway centerline. In addition, it
is assumed that the own aircraft transitions to go-around thrust, resulting in an increase in
airspeed of 15 kt at a rate of 1 kt/s.
Two sample contour plots of the Monte Carlo results are shown below. These particu-
lar plots were derived for the case in which xV = 200 (toward the own aircraft) and 4 = 200
(toward the own aircraft). The results contained in Figure 3.1 are derived from simula-
tions in which the own aircraft performs the avoidance maneuver described above. A sin-
gle contour of P(C I turn/climb) is shown. Figure 3.2 shows the results for a case in which
the own aircraft is assumed to follow the normal approach course. The graph shows a
contour of P(C I normal approach). Note that the coarseness of the contours is due to the
relatively large spread of conditions for which collision probability is calculated.
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Figure 3.1: Approximate Monte Carlo results: Own aircraft
performs an avoidance maneuver (N = 10,000)
(contour corresponds to P 2 0.001)
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Figure 3.2: Approximate Monte Carlo results: Own aircraft
follows normal approach course (N = 10,000)
(contour corresponds to P 2 0.001)
In the two-dimensional case, assuming that the own aircraft performs the climbing/
turning avoidance maneuver when an alert is issued, P(C I turn/climb) is always less than
or equal to P(C I normal approach). In other words, the single predefined avoidance
maneuver is always as safe or safer than following the normal approach. This is not the
case when altitude differences and climb rates are introduced, a situation that is discussed
at length in Section 5.4.2.
3.3 Approximation of the Alerting Zone
As mentioned above, the Monte Carlo simulations produce values of P(C I turn/climb) for
142,128 combinations of x, y, iy, 0 and Vint , and the alerting thresholds are set at those
combinations where P(C I turn/climb) is equal to the hazard level. In theory, the real-time
determination of P(C I turn/climb) could be done by interpolation among all the states.
However, a means of simplifying the alerting thresholds was developed through a set of
parameterized equations called the collision curve. The curve is used as a mechanism to
more efficiently represent the alerting threshold.
The collision curve defines those locations in the horizontal plane from which the
intruder will eventually be involved in a collision with the own aircraft, assuming that the
own aircraft follows the normal approach and the intruder maintains a constant-rate turn.
The collision curve can be conveniently expressed as two equations parameterized by the
time to collision, t. These equations give lateral position, x, and longitudinal position, y,
for the intruder relative to the own aircraft. Each combination of x and y represents a
position in which an intruder is projected to collide with the own aircraft.
x = R { cos (*t + W) + cos W} (3.1)
y = Vownt - R { sin (*jt + y) - sinIy} (3.2)
where R is the intruder's turn radius:
R = Vint2 (3.3)
g tan
where g is the gravitational constant. The time rate of heading change, ji, depends on the
intruder's bank angle and airspeed:
Sgtan (3.4)
Vint
An example collision curve for a single combination of y, 4, and Vint is shown in Figure
3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Collision curve
The intruding aircraft at A will collide with the own aircraft on the normal approach
path after ten seconds. Similarly, the intruder at B will collide with the own aircraft after
fifteen seconds. The two intruder trajectories are arc segments of a circle whose radius is
given by Equation 3.3.
The curve lies in the center of the contour associated with P(C I normal approach), but
deviates from the center of the contour associated with P(C I turn/climb) as lateral separa-
tion increases (Figure 3.4). However, this deviation was generally found to be less than a
few hundred feet for lateral separations less than 3000 ft. Also important is the fact that
the longitudinal width of the contours is roughly constant (1600 ft) with lateral position.
Given this information, the collision curve can be used as a tool to approximate the entire
P(C I turn/climb) contour.
P(C I normal approach) = 0.001
P(C I turn/climb) = 0.001
Collision
, Curve
Figure 3.4: Example location of collision curve with respect to
Monte Carlo probability contours
Recalling that alerts will be issued when P(C I turn/climb) = 0.001, approximation of
the P(C I turn/climb) contour using the collision curve results in two alerting criteria:
1. The intruder's longitudinal position must be within 800 ft of a collision curve
defined by Vint, Nf, 4 and Vow n -
2. The intruder must be within a range defined by the (x, y) point at which the collision
curve crosses the P(C I turn/climb) = 0.001 contour, shown in Figure 3.4.
The first criterion relies on the fact that the longitudinal width of the contour is constant
with lateral position and that the curve lies roughly in the center of the P(C I turn/climb) =
0.001 contour. Together, these two criteria define the alerting threshold shown in Figure
3.5.
Figure 3.5: Simplified alerting threshold
With these simplifications, an array indexed by Vint, x, 4 and Vown containing the hor-
izontal range values associated with the point at which P(C I turn/climb) = 0.001 is used to
store the alerting thresholds for the 142,128 conditions mentioned earlier. With the calcu-
lation of the arrays containing range limit values performed off-line, real-time alerting can
take place as shown in Figure 3.6. The specific process by which alerts are issued is
described below.
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Figure 3.6: Off-line calculations and real-time alerting
Based on the measured values of 4, 0 and Vint, a range limit is retrieved from the array
using linear interpolation. If the intruder is within range, the time to collision, tc, is deter-
mined based on the time required for the intruder to reach the own aircraft's runway cen-
terline:
COS- I[cos (W) -R] -
tc = (3.5)
Equation 3.5 was derived by manipulating the equation which defines the x-component of
the collision curve (Equation 3.1). After this step, the longitudinal position component, y,
along the curve corresponding to this point in time, tc, is determined using the second col-
lision curve equation (Equation 3.2). This value for longitudinal position, designated
Ycurve, is compared to the intruder's actual longitudinal position. If these two values of
longitudinal position are within 800 ft of each other, the intruder has a probability of colli-
sion greater than or equal to 0.001 and an alert is issued.
Table 3.3 shows a sample array with heading angle listed in the left-hand column and
bank angle across the top. Positive heading angles indicate that the intruder's trajectory
intercepts the own aircraft's runway centerline. Positive bank angles increase the
intruder's heading angle toward the own aircraft. This array pertains to the case where
Vint = 120 knots. The entire table for other values of Vint (140, 160 and 180 knots) is con-
tained in Appendix A. The minimum value allowed for a table entry is 800 ft, which cor-
responds to the longitudinal width of the alerting zone. Given an arbitrary combination of
x and 4, an appropriate range threshold value can be determined by interpolating among
the values stored in the table.
Table 3.3: Sample Lookup Table for Range Criterion
(values in feet)
Vint = Intruder Bank Angle
120 kts -200 -100 00 100 200 300 400
-400 800 800 800 800 800 1302 1775
-300 800 800 800 800 1076 1447 1842
-200 800 800 800 800 1196 1637 2015
-100 800 800 800 1081 1435 1822 2159
00 800 800 800 1341 1707 2029 2273
100 800 800 1344 1644 1943 2217 2488
200 800 1095 1687 1917 2206 2481 2815
300 923 1555 1919 2169 2424 2728 3013
400 1256 2040 2196 2421 2695 2938 3330
For example, assume that the following state measurements are obtained: x = 1500 ft,
y = 700 ft, Vint = 120 kts, y = 200 (toward the own aircraft), and 4 = 150 (also toward the
own aircraft). Also, the own aircraft's airspeed is 145 kts. The range limit, R, is retrieved
from the lookup table by interpolation:
R = 1917 +( 15- 100 (2206- 1917) = 2061.5 ft
This value is compared to the intruder's range,
x = 15002 + 7002 = 1655.3 ft
Since the intruder's range is less than R, the logic determines if the intruder is close
enough to the collision curve to warrant an alert. For a lateral position of 1500 ft, the
resulting Ycurve is 962.4 ft. Since the intruder's longitudinal position, y = 700 ft, is within
800 ft of the calculated value of Ycure, an alert is issued. A version of this alerting algo-
rithm written in pseudocode appears in Appendix B.
Recall that in Chapter 1, the advantages of designing thresholds which would adapt to
the situation were discussed. For the simple situation described in that chapter, a change
in heading of the blundering aircraft prompted an expansion of the alerting threshold. The
table above exhibits a similar characteristic. As the heading angle of the intruder turns
toward the own aircraft, the range limit increases and alerts are issued when there is a
greater separation between the two aircraft. Similarly, as the bank angle increases, indi-
cating a steeper turn toward the own aircraft, the range limit also increases. Close inspec-
tion of the remainder of the table in Appendix A shows that this behavior also holds for
changes in airspeed: an increase in airspeed at the same heading and bank angle combina-
tion expands the alerting threshold by increasing the range limit.
Chapter 4
Performance of the Two-Dimensional Alerting Logic
An evaluation of the alerting logic was made to determine whether performance goals
were being met. The methodology used to perform the evaluation is described in this
chapter. Subsequent results of the alerting logic evaluation are included, and performance
comparisons are made among the results.
4.1 Performance Evaluation Methodology
The performance of the two-dimensional alerting logic was evaluated using normal
approach and blunder trajectories flown during a simulator study at Rockwell-Collins [8].
Aircraft state data were recorded at a rate of 2.2 samples per second during the simula-
tions. Representative graphs of lateral versus longitudinal position for each of the seven
trajectories are shown below in Figures 4.1 through 4.7. In all cases, the own aircraft's
runway is assumed to be located at a positive lateral distance from the intruder's runway
centerline.
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Figure 4.1: 5' bank angle blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Figure 4.2: 10' heading change blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Figure 4.3: 15' heading change blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Figure 4.4: 300 heading change blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Figure 4.5: Fake blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Figure 4.6: Over-adjustment blunder (145 kts, windy conditions)
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Each of the seven trajectories was flown six times, once each at airspeeds of 130, 145, and
160 knots and once each in calm conditions and windy conditions1 . As noted, the exam-
ple tracks shown above are trajectories flown at 145 knots in windy conditions. Figures
4.8 and 4.9 show the variation of heading and bank angle over the course of the 145-kt
normal trajectory flown in windy conditions.
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Figure 4.8: Heading variations during normal approach
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Figure 4.9: Bank angle variations during normal approach
The own aircraft was assigned to follow one of two simulated normal approach
trajectories at 145 knots. An intruder flew alongside this own aircraft at the same altitude,
1. The over-adjustment blunder trajectory was flown only under windy conditions, for a total of 39
trajectories (instead of 6.7 = 42 trajectories).
following one of the normal approach or blunder trajectories from the simulator study.
The two aircraft were laterally spaced using runway separations of 1700, 2500, and 3400
ft. To emulate the range of possible longitudinal separations which could occur due to in-
trail spacing requirements, trajectories were offset longitudinally in 100 ft increments
from -9100 ft to 9100 ft. Therefore, the total number of simulations to produce the data in
this chapter is 42,822:
(39 intruder trajectories) - (2 own aircraft trajectories) - (4.1)
(3 runway separations) - (183 longitudinal spacings) = 42,822
If an alert was issued during the course of the parallel approach, a second own aircraft
was generated which broke away from the normal approach and followed the specified
avoidance maneuver. Therefore in each simulation there were a maximum of three air-
craft being simulated:
* Intruder
* Normal approach own aircraft
* Maneuvering own aircraft
Three-dimensional miss distances between the two simulated own aircraft and the intruder
were recorded, as well as whether an alert was issued, in order to measure the performance
of the alerting logic.
The outcome of each scenario is classified into one of six categories based on the miss
distances and whether or not an alert was issued. The rate at which each outcome occurs
over the course of N simulations is used to establish the performance of the alerting sys-
tem. Each of the six outcomes is defined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Possible Simulated Parallel Approach Outcomes
Collision During Alert Collision DuringOutcome Normal Approach? Issued? Maneuver Trajectory?
Correct Rejection No No N/A
Missed Detection Yes No N/A
Unnecessary Alert No Yes No
Induced Collision No Yes Yes
Correct Detection Yes Yes No
Late Alert Yes Yes Yes
No alerts are issued during those scenarios which are classified into the first two out-
comes listed in the table. These two outcomes are shown in Figure 4.10. During a correct
rejection scenario shown on the left, there is no need for an alert and one is never issued.
During a missed detection shown on the right, no alert is ever issued even though a colli-
sion occurs at X. In the current system, alerts are issued when the two aircraft close to
within 800 feet of each other, regardless of the intruder's attitude. Therefore, a collision
(less than 500 feet miss distance) which occurs without an alert indicates a system mal-
function or a severe state measurement error.
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Figure 4.10: Possible outcomes when no alert is issued
When alerts are issued to the own aircraft during the approach, there are four possible
outcomes. An example of each of these outcomes is diagrammed in Figure 4.11. During
an unnecessary alert scenario pictured in the upper left corner, an alert is issued but no col-
lision would have occurred if the own aircraft had followed the normal approach. An
induced collision (upper right corner) is a special case of the unnecessary alert in that the
avoidance maneuver prompted by the alert causes a collision which would not have
occurred otherwise.
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Figure 4.11: Possible outcomes when an alert is issued
The lower two diagrams within Figure 4.11 are examples of scenarios in which a colli-
sion would have occurred over the course of the normal approach. If the alert was not
issued early enough to insure adequate separation, it is termed a late alert. A late alert sit-
uation appears in the lower right corner. Otherwise, the alert enabled the own aircraft to
successfully avoid a collision and the outcome is called a correct detection. Such a sce-
nario appears in the lower left corner.
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With an ideal system, only correct rejections and correct detections would occur. The
alerting system would function such that safe situations do not trigger alerts while all situ-
ations in which collisions would occur prompt alerts which enable the conflict to be
resolved safely. This ideal system requires the ability to predict the future trajectories of
both aircraft without error. However, even with perfect sensors, the aircrafts' future tra-
jectories are uncertain because of the potential for either aircraft to initiate unexpected
maneuvers. Therefore, designing the ideal alerting system is not possible and unnecessary
alerts must be traded off against collisions.
4.2 Performance Evaluation Results
Table 4.2 presents the observed system performance of the two-dimensional alerting logic
under purely two-dimensional parallel approach situations. The data encompass the
results obtained over all trajectories, at all runway separations and at all intruder airspeeds,
for a total of 42,822 simulations. Standard deviation estimates associated with the out-
come probabilities were computed using Equation 2.2.
Table 4.2: Overall Performance of 2-D Alerting Logic
(all runway spacings, all intruder airspeeds)
Correct Missed Unnecessary Induced Correct Late
Rejection Detection Alert Collision Detection Alert
Probability 9.3x10 -1  0.0 3.3x10 -2  2.8x10 -4  3.4x10 -2  0.0
S 1.2x10 -3  <1x10 -6  8.7x10 -4  8.1x10 -5  8.8x10 -4  <lxl0-6
The results of this evaluation process must be interpreted carefully. The probability
values associated with each outcome are highly dependent on the parallel approach sce-
narios which were simulated. For this evaluation, most of the scenarios included a blun-
der situation. Also, the types of blunders which may occur during actual parallel
approaches may differ significantly from those used for this evaluation. Therefore, the
probability values and corresponding standard deviations must be considered in the con-
text of the type and number of blunders which were simulated.
Unnecessary alerts may not be undesirable when they occur during scenarios in which
the miss distance between the intruder and the own aircraft would otherwise have been
close to 500 ft. Therefore, miss distance establishes another measure of alerting logic per-
formance. The graph in Figure 4.12 shows the cumulative probability distribution of miss
distances over all blunder scenarios and at all intruder airspeeds. Over eighty percent of
all unnecessary alerts occurred during scenarios in which the miss distances would have
been less than 1000 ft had the alert not be issued. Thus, most unnecessary alerts may actu-
ally be considered appropriate.
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of projected miss distances during
unnecessary alert scenarios
Also important is the number of unnecessary alerts that occurred when the intruder
flew a normal approach. An alerting logic that issues unnecessary alerts during normal
approaches decreases the number of simultaneous parallel approaches that can be per-
formed. Under two-dimensional conditions, the two-dimensional alerting logic was
observed to not issue any unnecessary alerts during normal approaches at any runway sep-
aration or intruder airspeed. Unnecessary alerts only occurred during scenarios in which
the intruder blundered. Thus, it appears that the logic can successfully filter hazardous sit-
uations from normal localizer/glideslope tracking errors, indicating that parallel
approaches to runways spaced 1700 ft apart may be feasible.
Parametric comparisons can be made by decomposing the performance data into sub-
sets.
4.2.1 Effect of Runway Separation
As outlined in Section 3.2, it is desirable to safely reduce the runway separation mini-
mum required for conducting independent parallel approaches. The PRM system has low-
ered this minimum from 4300 ft to 3400 ft. Comparing the performance of the
probability-based alerting logic under different runway separations will provide insight as
to whether the probability-based alerting system can safely lower the minimum still fur-
ther. The data for comparison are listed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: System Performance as a Function of Runway Separation
(all intruder airspeeds)
Runway Correct Missed Unnecessary Induced Correct Late
Separation Rejection Detection Alert Collision Detection Alert
1700 ft 9.14x10 -1  0.0 4.72x10 -2  4.20x10 -4  3.79x10 -2  0.0
C" 2.3x10 -3  <1x10 -6  1.8x10 -3  1.7x10 -4  1.6x10 -3 <1x10-6
2500 ft 9.37x10 -1  0.0 3.00x10 -2  4.20x10 -4  3.24x10 -2  0.0
C 2.0x10 -3  <1x10 -6  1.4x10 -3  1.7x10 -4  1.5x10 -3  <1x10 -6
3400 ft 9.45x10 -1  0.0 2.30x10 -2  0.0 3.19x10 -2  0.0
G 1.9x10 -3  <1x10-6  1.3x10 -3  <lxl0-6  1.5x10 -3  <lx10 -6
These data show that as runway separation is increased, the number of unnecessary
alerts declines. As runway separation decreases, more hazardous situations occur,
prompting more unnecessary alerts. This trend can be seen in Figure 4.13. The graph
shows the cumulative probability distribution of miss distances which would have
occurred had the unnecessary alerts not been issued. The results are graphed for each of
the three runway separations tested. As mentioned before, the data are highly dependent
on the number and type of blunders which were used in the evaluation process. The distri-
bution of miss distances changes very little when the runway separation drops from 3400
ft to 2500 ft. However, a significant change occurs when the runway separation is
decreased further to 1700 ft.
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Figure 4.13: Projected miss distances during unnecessary alert
scenarios as a function of runway separation
When the runway separation is reduced to 1700 ft, the intruder's position triggers a
greater number of unnecessary alerts. The majority of this difference takes place during
the fake and over-adjustment blunder scenarios. During these scenarios, unnecessary
alerts occurred when the runways were separated by 1700 ft but not at the two other sepa-
rations. As can be seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, these two blunder trajectories have a maxi-
mum lateral deviation off the runway centerline of approximately 1000 ft. At larger
runway separations, the alerting threshold is not crossed. At 1700 ft, however, the intruder
closes to within 700 ft of the own aircraft's runway centerline and prompts an alert in situ-
ations which would not have demanded an alert at the other runway separations. During
the other scenarios, the number of unnecessary alerts is roughly equivalent among the
three runway separations.
4.2.2 Effect of Intruder Airspeed
Similar comparisons of alerting logic performance are made for different intruder air-
speeds. Table 4.4 contains the results of this investigation.
Table 4.4: System Performance as a Function of Intruder Airspeed
(all runway spacings)
Intruder Correct Missed Unnecessary Induced Correct Late
Airspeed Rejection Detection Alert Collision Detection Alert
130 kt 9.33x10 -1  0.0 3.26x10 -2  0.0 3.41x10 -2  0.0
0 2.1x10 -3  <1x10 -6  1.5x10 -3  <1x10 -6  1.5x10 -3  <1x10 -6
145 kt 9.30x10 -1  0.0 3.47x10 -2  5.60x10 -4  3.52x10 -2  0.0
0 2.1x10 -3  <1x10-6  1.5x10 -3  2.0x10 -4  1.5x10 -3  <1x10-6
160 kt 9.34x10 -1  0.0 3.29x10 -2  2.80x10 -4  3.29x10 -2  0.0
G 2.1x10 -3  <1x10-6  1.5x10 -3  1.4x10 -4  1.5x10 -3  <lxl0-6
The performance of the alerting logic is reasonably consistent between each of the
three intruder airspeeds examined. However, induced collisions occur when the intruder's
airspeed is 145 or 160 knots but none occur when the airspeed is 130 knots. The reason
for this phenomenon is related to the specific trajectories involved and is discussed in the
next section.
4.2.3 Problematic Trajectories
Only two of the blunder trajectory types caused collisions: the 5' bank angle blunder
and the 100 heading change blunder. No accidents occurred during the 150 and 300 head-
ing change blunders. Table 4.5 shows blunders during which collisions occurred.
Table 4.5: Rate of Induced Collisions During Specific Blunders
Blunder Type Induced Collisions
5S bank angle 16.7 %
10' heading change 83.3 %
15' heading change 0.0 %
30' heading change 0.0 %
All induced collisions occurred during trajectories in which the intruder was as fast or
faster than the own aircraft and during trajectories in which the intruder's nominal heading
and bank angles were low. A further investigation as to the cause of these induced colli-
sions points to the location of the intruder at the time the alert was issued. In 75% of the
induced collisions recorded above, the intruder had already crossed the own aircraft's run-
way centerline at the time of the alert. This leads to the geometry shown in Figure 4.14.
800 ft
Figure 4.14: Induced collision configuration
Within the alerting logic, the range limit is always at least 800 ft. When the intruder
crosses the own aircraft's runway centerline, the intruder's relative heading and bank
angle switch from positive (toward the own aircraft) to negative (away from the own air-
craft). However, alerts may still be issued if the intruder crosses within 800 ft of the own
aircraft. For the intruder at A, an alert is likely if the intruder's airspeed is greater than the
own aircraft's airspeed. The intruder will overtake the own aircraft and enter the alerting
zone from behind, especially in situations in which the intruder's heading and bank angle
are low. Once the alert is issued, the own aircraft turns toward the intruder, possibly caus-
ing a collision which would not have occurred otherwise. Based on these results, it may
be appropriate to alter the alerting logic in order to inhibit alerts after the intruder crosses
the own aircraft's runway centerline. Further work needs to be done to determine whether
such a change to the logic is appropriate.
4.3 Resultant versus Design Hazard Level
To determine whether the alerting logic achieves the design level of performance, the
resulting hazard level was calculated from the scenario outcomes recorded above. The
hazard level is defined as the probability that an accident will occur after an alert is issued
during a scenario in which the intruder blunders. This statistic corresponds to the follow-
ing combination of the outcomes defined above:
Hazard Level = Induced Collisions + Late Alerts + Missed Detections (4.2)
Unnecessary Alerts + Induced Collisions + Late Alerts + Correct Detections
The quantity in the numerator is the total number of collisions that were unresolved by the
alerting system. The quantity in the denominator is the total number of alerts that were
issued during blunder trajectories. The overall hazard level computed in this manner is
shown in Table 4.6 and is compared to the maximum acceptable hazard level correspond-
ing to the design goal. Ideally, the two quantities would be equivalent.
Table 4.6: Resultant versus Design Hazard Level
Statistic Overall Result Design Goal
Hazard Level 0.0041 0.0010
G 0.0003 N/A
The discrepancy between these two values is due to a number of factors. The collision
curve approximation to the actual alerting threshold established by contour plots of Monte
Carlo results may not have been accurate enough, allowing a greater number of accidents
than would have occurred if the simplifications had not been made. Also, prior to per-
forming the Monte Carlo simulations, standard deviations of the error distributions were
estimated. Specifically, the values chosen for a. and (T may not have been large enough
to allow for unexpected future maneuvers by the intruding aircraft. In addition, the mea-
surement of intruder airspeed was assumed to be deterministic and no error was included.
A combination of all or some of these factors may have caused the discrepancy between
the resultant and design hazard levels.
The hazard level was also calculated for the three different runway separations and for
the three different intruder airspeeds (Tables 4.7 and 4.8).
Table 4.7: Effect of Runway Separation on Hazard Level
Runway Observed
Separation Hazard Level
1700 ft 0.0049 0.0020
2500 ft 0.0067 0.0027
3400 ft 0.0000 <0.0001
Table 4.8: Effect of Intruder Airspeed on Hazard Level
Intruder Observed
Airspeed Hazard Level
130 knots 0.0000 <0.0001
145 knots 0.0080 0.0028
160 knots 0.0042 0.0021
These data show that the resulting alerting logic achieves the design performance only
when the intruder's airspeed is 130 knots. This may be due to a decrease in the longitudi-
nal width of the probability contour. Any variations in this width with respect to intruder
airspeed were not taken into account when the alerting logic was developed. Therefore,
the 1600 ft longitudinal width may be adequate for intruder airspeeds of 130 knots but too
low for faster intruders. Possible sources of error in the calculation of the 1600-ft value
were discussed above.
It should be noted that the observed hazard level is highly dependent on the number of
unnecessary alerts which occur. As the number of unnecessary alerts increases, the hazard
level decreases because the total number of alerts increases without a proportional
increase in the number of collisions.
Finally, a hazard level associated with each blunder trajectory was calculated. The
results appear in Table 4.9. The hazard levels associated with the 50 bank angle blunder
and the 10' heading change blunder indicate that collisions are likely to occur during this
type of blunder trajectory even when the alerting system is operating. Section 4.2.3
explained the cause of many of the collisions which occurred. Further work is needed to
determine whether the logic can be altered such that the acceptable hazard level (0.001) is
not exceeded when these types of blunders occur. Because no accidents occurred during
the remaining four blunders, the hazard level associated with these blunders is zero.
Table 4.9: Hazard Level During Blunder Trajectories
Observed
Blunder Type Hazard Level
5' bank angle blunder 0.0036 0.0025
100 heading change blunder 0.0136 0.0043
150 heading change blunder 0.0000 <0.0001
30' heading change blunder 0.0000 <0.0001
Fake blunder 0.0000 <0.0001
Over adjustment blunder 0.0000 <0.0001
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Chapter 5
Three-Dimensional Alerting Logic
Modifications to the baseline alerting logic were made in order to account for variations in
the intruder's altitude and climb rate. First, this chapter outlines the expected performance
of the two-dimensional logic under three-dimensional parallel approach geometries and
motivates the need for an enhancement to the alerting algorithm. To this end, two separate
altitude criteria were incorporated into the logic, and a comparison of the system's perfor-
mance using each of the two criteria is made. As in the two-dimensional logic, only one
avoidance maneuver is assumed: a combined turn with climb.
5.1 Three-Dimensional Alerting Issues
During two-dimensional parallel approaches, the alerting threshold lies completely within
the probability contours associated with P(C I normal approach). In other words, P(C I
turn/climb) is always less than or equal to P(C I normal approach). For example, consider
the following two-dimensional scenario.
Scenario #1: An intruder is coaltitude with the own aircraft and slowly
moves into a relative horizontal position such that there is an unacceptably
high probability that a collision will occur during the normal approach. A
short time later, the alerting threshold associated with the turn/climb
maneuver is crossed and the own aircraft initiates that avoidance maneuver.
Recasting this scenario in terms of the quantities calculated with Monte Carlo simulations,
P(C I turn/climb) increases from zero to 0.001 when the alerting threshold is crossed.
Meanwhile, P(C I normal approach) increases from zero to a value greater than 0.001.
Therefore, the probability of a collision along the normal approach is unacceptably high
and the avoidance trajectory must be taken instead.
During a two-dimensional situation in which an alert is issued such as Scenario #1,
there is only one possible sequence in which these increases in collision probability take
place (Figure 5.1). In a situation denoted by A, the intruder is in a location from which a
collision is unlikely along either the normal approach or avoidance trajectories. There-
fore, both P(C I normal approach) and P(C I turn/climb) are less than 0.001. As the
intruder's location changes to one within region B, a collision is probable if the own air-
craft remains on the normal approach. Thus, P(C I normal approach) exceeds 0.001.
Finally, when the intruder penetrates region C, a collision becomes unacceptably likely
along the avoidance maneuver trajectory and an alert is issued.
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Figure 5.1: Issuing an alert during a two-dimensional situation
When the approach geometries are three-dimensional, this sequence does not neces-
sarily hold. Consider the following scenario in which the same two-dimensional alerting
logic is used to issue alerts to the own aircraft during a three-dimensional approach situa-
tion:
Scenario #2: An intruder is several hundred feet above the own aircraft.
Slowly, the intruder moves into the relative lateral and longitudinal posi-
tions from Scenario #1 but maintains the initial vertical separation. After a
short time, the intruder crosses the alerting threshold and the own aircraft
initiates the turn-climb maneuver.
In terms of probability values, P(C I turn/climb) in Scenario #2 is greater than P(C I normal
approach) since the normal approach involves a shallow descent away from the intruder
while the turn/climb maneuver will increase the own aircraft's altitude toward that of the
intruder. Therefore, an induced collision may result. However, because the alerting
thresholds only consider horizontal position, the alert is still issued. Figure 5.2 shows this
process.
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Figure 5.2: Issuing an alert during a three-dimensional situation
Path A is identical to the alerting process which occurs during a two-dimensional situ-
ation. Path B, which can occur if the intruder is above the own aircraft or is climbing, is
problematic. Because the probability of a collision along the turn/climb trajectory exceeds
the threshold value, an alert is issued even though the normal approach is actually a safer
option. Therefore, the two-dimensional logic operating under three-dimensional condi-
tions is likely to issue more unnecessary alerts. Also, since the avoidance maneuver is
actually less safe than continuing the approach, induced collisions may occur. In order to
reduce the number of unnecessary alerts which may be issued and which may potentially
result in induced collisions, the two-dimensional alerting logic should be augmented in a
way that accounts for the vertical separation and climb rates of the two aircraft.
5.2 Altitude Criteria
To improve the performance of the two-dimensional alerting logic under three-dimen-
sional conditions, two preliminary altitude criteria were added separately to the two-
dimensional algorithm. Both criteria use the time-to-collision parameter, tc, calculated to
determine whether the intruder's longitudinal position places it within the alerting zone
(Equation 3.5). Figure 5.3 shows the state measurements and calculations involved.
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Figure 5.3: Prediction of final relative altitude
The first criterion, called the Normal Approach Altitude Criterion, predicts the vertical
separation, labelled hnorm in Figure 5.3, at the closest point of approach between the
intruder and the own aircraft which follows the normal approach. This calculation is
based on the aircraft climb rates and their relative altitude, along with the time-to-collision
parameter. If this final relative altitude is less than some threshold distance, and if the
intruder's lateral and longitudinal position would otherwise prompt an alert, an alert is
issued.
Similarly, the second criterion, called the Avoidance Maneuver Altitude Criterion, pre-
dicts vertical separation, labelled hav, at the closest point of approach which would occur
if the own aircraft performed an avoidance maneuver. The definition of the own aircraft's
avoidance maneuver, along with the intruder's initial relative altitude and climb rate, is
used to calculate hav. Again, if the final relative altitude is less than some threshold dis-
tance, an alert is issued.
In both cases, the vertical threshold distance is associated with the height of the alert-
ing zone in the vertical plane. This zone was established in the same manner that the lon-
gitudinal width of the alerting zone in the horizontal plane was established. In
determining the longitudinal width, Monte Carlo simulations were run at a longitudinal
increments across a range of lateral separations. From this process, it was determined that
the width of the P(C I maneuver) = 0.001 contour was roughly constant (1600 ft) with lat-
eral position and with initial heading and bank angle.
To determine the height of the same contour in three-dimensional space, Monte Carlo
simulations were run at a variety of altitudes across a range of lateral separations. This
same process was performed at a series of longitudinal positions. From these calculations,
the height of the alerting zone was determined to be approximately 1600 ft. This value
held reasonably well across lateral separations and the longitudinal positions which were
investigated. Since the alerting zone was found to have a height of approximately 1600 ft,
an alert is issued if the predicted vertical separation is less than 800 ft.
5.3 Three-Dimensional Performance Evaluation Methodology
The three-dimensional performance evaluation methodology is similar to the methodol-
ogy used to evaluate two-dimensional performance described in Section 4.1. Each
intruder trajectory, including blunders and normal approaches, was run alongside one of
two normal approaches of the own aircraft. A third aircraft was simulated which per-
formed the avoidance maneuver if an alert was issued.
To simulate three-dimensional parallel approach geometries, the intruder was permit-
ted to deviate vertically from the own aircraft's altitude. During each of the scenarios, the
intruder was assigned a vertical offset of -1000, -500, 0, 500, or 1000 ft from the own air-
craft's altitude. Also, a climb rate of -1000, -500, 0, 500, or 1000 ft/min was assigned to
begin as soon as the intruder deviated off course and began to blunder. With these addi-
tional scenario variations, the total number of simulations run to produce the data in this
chapter is 1,070,550:
(39 intruder trajectories) • (2 own aircraft trajectories) - (3 runway separations) - (5.1)
(183 longitudinal spacings) - (5 altitude offsets) - (5 climb rates) = 1,070,550
5.4 Performance of Alerting Logic under Altitude and Climb Rate Varia-
tions
In order to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the two altitude criteria, the evalua-
tion process was performed twice, once with each criterion. Also, the performance of the
two-dimensional logic under three-dimensional parallel approach scenarios was assessed
for comparison. The results are listed in Table 5.1. These data encompass all intruder tra-
jectories at all airspeeds and at all runway separations.
Table 5.1: Alerting Logic Performance Under 3-D Scenarios
Each row refers to the performance of a different version of the alerting logic. The No
Vertical Criterion row refers to the performance of the two-dimensional alerting logic
under three-dimensional approach geometries. The Normal Approach and Avoidance
Maneuver rows list the performance of the two versions of the alerting logic with those
altitude criteria.
5.4.1 Unnecessary Alerts
The unnecessary alert rate has been significantly reduced with the addition of either of
the altitude criteria. During three-dimensional approach geometries, collisions are
unlikely to occur in two situations, even if a blunder takes place:
1. The intruder is above the own aircraft and climbing.
2. The intruder is below the own aircraft and descending.
If the alerting logic disregards altitude and climb rate information when issuing alerts, an
intruder in either of these situations may prompt an alert based solely on lateral and longi-
tudinal position. The two-dimensional logic discounts all altitude information and issues
a high number of unnecessary alerts during the two situations listed above. Figure 5.4
shows the rough distribution of unnecessary alerts issued by the two-dimensional alerting
logic under three-dimensional approaches as a function of intruder's altitude and climb
rate. This is a coarse contour plot based on datapoints at the intersection of gridlines. For
example, 4-6% of all unnecessary alerts occurred when the intruder was 500 ft above the
own aircraft and climbing at a rate of 500 ft/min.
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Figure 5.4: Unnecessary alert distribution: No Vertical Criterion
(2D)
When the Normal Approach three-dimensional alerting logic is used instead, the total
number of unnecessary alerts issued under the two conditions listed above is reduced. The
logic predicts future vertical separation based on the initial altitude separation of the two
aircraft involved and both aircrafts' climb rates. Since the own aircraft is in a very shal-
low descent, alerts are issued most often when the intruder is coaltitude, above and
descending, or below and climbing. Therefore the majority of unnecessary alerts associ-
ated with an intruder that is above and climbing or below and descending are eliminated.
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of unnecessary alerts using the Normal Approach Alti-
tude Criterion.
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Figure 5.5: Unnecessary alert distribution: Normal Approach
Altitude Criterion (3D)
The distribution of unnecessary alerts changes again when the Avoidance Maneuver
Altitude Criterion is considered. This version of the logic alerts in situations where the
intruder will be coaltitude with the avoidance maneuver trajectory at the projected time of
collision. Since all alerts are issued in this manner, most unnecessary alerts are issued in
situations in which the intruder is above the own aircraft or ascending. This trend can be
seen in Figure 5.6.
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5.4.2 Induced Collisions and Late Alerts
As shown in Table 5.1, the number of induced collisions and late alerts that occurred
with the three alerting logic versions tested under three-dimensional parallel approach
geometries remains roughly constant. However, slight differences in the number of
induced collisions and late alerts arise because of differences in the alerting process.
When the Normal Approach Altitude Criterion is added to the two-dimensional logic,
the induced collision rate increases. This increase may be due to the fact that the alerts are
issued slightly later because both horizontal and vertical position requirements must be
met before the alert is issued. However, more analysis needs to be performed to better
understand the reason for this increased induced collision rate.
Also, a subtle change in the alerting process may have contributed to the increase in
induced collisions when the Normal Approach Altitude Criterion is used. Section 5.1 con-
trasted the processes by which alerts were issued by the two-dimensional and three-
dimensional alerting logics. However, when the Normal Approach criterion was used, a
step was added to this process which assures that the normal approach trajectory has
become dangerous before issuing an alert (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: Issuing an alert under Normal Approach Altitude
Criterion
In case B, the potential exists for alerts to be issued when P(C I turn/climb) is much
greater than P(C I normal approach). Therefore, it is likely that induced collisions will
occur. This is seen when comparing the performance of the two-dimensional logic to that
of the Normal Approach logic.
When the Normal Approach criterion is replaced with the Avoidance Maneuver crite-
rion, the rate of induced collisions declines. The criterion within the logic checks to see if
the probability of a collision along the avoidance trajectory has exceeded the maximum
acceptable limit before an alert is issued, thus better assuring the safety of the avoidance
maneuver.
When the Avoidance Maneuver criterion is used, a greater number of late alerts occur.
The Avoidance Maneuver criterion places a different requirement on the intruder's alti-
tude which may allow late alerts to occur more often. More work needs to be done in
order to fully explain the increase in late alert rate.
5.4.3 Hazard Levels
The hazard levels for each version of the alerting logic were calculated and are
included in Table 5.2. The increase in calculated hazard level between the two-dimen-
sional logic and both versions of the three-dimensional logic is not due to the increase in
the number of collisions which occurred, which varied by about 3%. Instead, the increase
is due to the significant reduction in the number of unnecessary alerts. Because hazard
level is defined as unresolved blunders over total number of alerts (Equation 4.2), fewer
alerts implies that the hazard level increases, even though the performance may have actu-
ally improved slightly.
Table 5.2: Alerting Logic Hazard Levels Under 3-D Approaches
Alerting Logic Hazard Level a
Two-Dimensional Logic 0.0035 0.0002
Normal Approach Altitude Criterion 0.0060 0.0004
Avoidance Maneuver Altitude Criterion 0.0048 0.0003
Chapter 6
Effect of Avoidance Maneuvers
This chapter describes the possible advantages of incorporating additional avoidance
maneuvers into the existing alerting logic. First, the performance limitations due to hav-
ing only a single avoidance maneuver available are discussed, as well as the expected ben-
efits of introducing an additional maneuver. Next, a preliminary investigation was made
in which the logic selects one of two avoidance maneuvers. The results from this investi-
gation are presented.
When the alerting logic is designed to choose among several maneuvers, additional
alerting options arise. The nature of the situation may dictate that an alert should be
issued when one maneuver becomes unsafe, or when all but one maneuver are unsafe.
The consequences of these designs are discussed and some preliminary evaluations are
made.
6.1 Limitations of Single Maneuver
In the most general three-dimensional case, each possible own aircraft trajectory has asso-
ciated with it a semi-infinite alerting zone. This zone consists of all intruder locations in
three-dimensional space which will eventually result in a collision with the own aircraft.
These zones were discussed in Section 3.3 and formed the basis for the alerting logic. In
two-dimensional situations, the alerting zone has a finite size for all own aircraft trajecto-
ries except the normal approach trajectory. This collapse of a semi-infinite alerting zone
down to a finite one enabled the logic developed earlier to function effectively.
In the logic discussed throughout the previous chapters, alerts were issued when the
intruder entered the zone associated with the turn/climb avoidance maneuver. In the two-
dimensional parallel approach situation, this zone is contained entirely within the normal
approach alerting zone (Figure 6.1). The solid line A shows the intruder locations which
will cause a collision between the intruder and the own aircraft following the turn/climb
avoidance maneuver. It is representative of the center of the probability contour corre-
sponding to P(C I turn/climb) = hazard level. Similarly, solid line B shows locations from
which an intruder would collide with the own aircraft on normal approach. This curve is
the collision curve developed in Section 3.3.
h
Avoidance Trajectory
-5~ ~s--o .. . Intruder Trajectory -
Figure 6.1: Alerting zones under two-dimensional constraint
Because the intruder is constrained to be coaltitude with the own aircraft in the two-
dimensional case, the probability contour (represented by curve A) associated with the
avoidance maneuver is limited in size. As the lateral separation between the intruder and
own aircraft increases, the avoidance trajectory will provide more vertical separation
between the two aircraft after the alert. At some point in time, this vertical separation will
exceed 500 ft in which case a collision is impossible. Meanwhile, if the own aircraft were
to have followed the normal approach, no vertical separation would have taken place and
collisions can occur over a wider range of initial intruder lateral positions. Therefore,
curve A is significantly shorter than curve B.
When the intruder's altitude restriction is lifted, A and B are both likely to change in
size. If the intruder matches the avoidance maneuver climb rate and altitude, A becomes
larger than B. In this situation, the size of curve B decreases: the altitude separation limits
the initial horizontal positions from which the intruder can cause an accident. The size of
A increases since altitude separation between the two aircraft disappears when the own
aircraft climbs along the avoidance path.
This effect reduces the ability of the current alerting logic to function well under three-
dimensional conditions if only one maneuver is allowed. The two-dimensional logic only
determines whether the intruder is in a horizontal position which will cause an accident. If
the intruder matches the avoidance maneuver climb rate, the maneuver may be more dan-
gerous than the normal approach course but the alert may be issued anyway.
6.2 Effects of Introducing a Level Turn Maneuver
It is proposed that introducing additional maneuver options into the alerting logic can
reduce the effects described above. Specifically, a constant-altitude turn maneuver could
be incorporated into the logic along with the climbing maneuver which is already present.
The result of this addition can be seen in Figure 6.2 using three curves similar to the ones
shown in Figure 6.1. However the curves will shift depending on the intruder's altitude or
climb rate. Figure 6.2 shows the three curves if the intruder climbs at the same rate
required for the turn/climb avoidance maneuver.
Climbing :,
Avoidance
Trajectory
Figure 6.2: Alerting zones if intruder is climbing
In this case, curve A corresponds to the locus of initial intruder positions that will
cause a collision between the intruder and an own aircraft following the climbing turn tra-
jectory. The curve lies in the center of the P(C I turn/climb) = 0.001 probability contour.
Curve B is the locus of points which will cause an accident if the own aircraft follows the
normal approach (i.e. the center of the P(C I normal approach) = 0.001 contour). Finally,
curve C corresponds to a new probability contour: P(C I turn) = 0.001.
Curve C is the same size as curve A from Figure 6.1. The altitude separation between
a climbing intruder and level own aircraft limits the number of lateral intruder positions
which can cause an accident. Also, the heading change associated with the maneuver
increases the separation between the two aircraft. Curve B is similar in size because the
same altitude separation may occur, although the lack of a heading change means that this
curve is somewhat larger than curve C. Again, curve A is the largest of the three because
less altitude separation occurs if both the intruder and the own aircraft climb.
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A preliminary evaluation of an alerting logic which chooses between the level turn or
climbing turn has been implemented. The climbing turn is the same maneuver which has
been used throughout this thesis. The level turn entails the same turn but the aircraft per-
forms a 0.25g pull-up from the glideslope descent rate until the aircraft is maintaining alti-
tude--the pull-up is not continued into a climb.
The logic first performs the horizontal position test outlined in Section 3.3. This test
involves the intruder's lateral and longitudinal position and the predicted time to collision.
Next, the Normal Approach Criterion from Section 5.1 is applied. If the predicted vertical
separation between the intruder and the own aircraft following the normal approach path
is less than 800 ft, an alert is issued.
At this point, a choice is made between the two maneuvers. Vertical separation is pre-
dicted between the intruder and two own aircraft: one which performs the level turn, and
another which performs the climbing turn. The maneuver that is predicted to result in the
maximum vertical separation between the two aircraft is performed. The results of this
preliminary evaluation are listed in Table 6.1, with the Normal Approach Altitude Crite-
rion evaluation results included for comparison.
Table 6.1: Performance of Alerting Logic with Two Maneuver Options
Correct Missed Unnecessary Induced Correct Late
Logic Rejection Detection Alert Collision Detection Alert
Two Maneuver 1 5OpTwo 9.59x10-1 0.0 3.14x10 -2  2.08x10 -4  9.25x10 -3  4.95x10 -5
Options
G 1.9x10 -4  <1x10 -6  1.7x10 -4  1.4x10 -5  9.3x10 -5  6.8x10 -6
Normal 9.59x10- 1  0.0 3.14x10 -2  2.12x10 -4  9.26x10 -3  3.46x10 -5
Approach (3D)
G 1.9x10 -4  <1x10 -6  1.7x10 -4  1.4x10 -5  9.3x10 -5  5.7x10 -6
The performance of the alerting logic which chooses between the level turn and climb-
ing turn maneuver is similar to the performance of the three-dimensional logic using the
Normal Approach Altitude Criterion logic. Induced collisions were reduced while the rate
of late alerts increased. The unnecessary alert rate and hazard level are approximately
equal between the two systems.
The outcomes resulting during scenarios in which the turn/climb maneuver was cho-
sen and when the level turn maneuver was chosen are separated in Table 6.2. The Correct
Rejection and Missed Detection outcomes are not included in the table because no alert is
issued during these scenarios, and thus no maneuver is selected. During the 43,837 simu-
lations in which alerts were issued, the turn/climb maneuver was chosen 40,109 times, and
the level turn maneuver was chosen during the remaining 3,728 scenarios.
Table 6.2: Performance of Logic when Choosing Each Maneuver Option
Unnecessary Induced Correct
Alert Collision Detection
Turn/Climb 7.53x10 -1  1.97x10 -3  2.44x10 -1  1.32x10 -3
Y 2.2x10 -3  2.2x10 -4  2. 1x10 -3  1.8x10 -4
Level Turn 9.28x10 -1  3.86x10 -2  3.30x10 -2  0.0
G 4.2x10 -3  3.2x10 -3  2.9x10 -3  <1x10 -6
The most significant result shown above is the increase in induced collision rate asso-
ciated with the level turn maneuver. Based on the argument outlined in Section 4.2.3, it is
possible that a greater number of unnecessary alerts became induced collisions than was
expected because of the own aircraft's constant altitude flight. When the intruder crosses
the own aircraft's runway centerline, the own aircraft remains at constant altitude instead
of climbing. Therefore, what might have been an unnecessary alert becomes an induced
collision because no altitude separation takes place.
6.3 Alerting Logic Variations
The introduction of additional avoidance maneuvers into the alerting logic allows the
logic to function in a number of different ways. These logic variations arise because each
maneuver has associated with it a distinct alerting threshold. The thresholds are set
around the points in space where P(C I maneuver) is greater than the hazard level goal.
Therefore, for each avoidance maneuver, a different threshold defined by P(C I maneuver)
appears.
A conservative or a critical system may be designed based on the number of maneuver
thresholds which must be crossed before an alert is issued (Figure 6.3). The logic may be
designed to issue alerts when one of the thresholds associated with a particular maneuver
is crossed. In this case, the probability of a collision over the course of that maneuver is
greater than the threshold level. For the other maneuvers, the probability of a collision is
much lower than the threshold level and the logic chooses the safest of the remaining
maneuvers. This is a conservative system.
On the other hand, the logic may be designed to issue an alert only when all of the
thresholds have been crossed. For example, when this variation of the logic is operating
with three maneuver options available, the intruding aircraft only prompts an alert when
all three of the thresholds have been crossed. Two of the maneuvers have associated with
them a probability of collision which is greater than the threshold level. The remaining
maneuver has a probability of collision equal to the threshold level and is deemed to be the
safest of the three. The alert is issued and this maneuver is performed as it is the last
option available. This is a critical system.
Figure 6.3 depicts some representative thresholds associated with particular avoidance
maneuvers and depicts the alerting thresholds within the critical and conservative systems.
The alerting threshold of the conservative system is the union of all of the probability con-
tours associated with all of the possible maneuvers and is shown in the figure with a
heavy, dashed line. In the critical system, the alerting threshold is the intersection of all of
these contours, denoted by the heavy, solid line.
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Figure 6.3: Representative alerting thresholds associated with
different maneuvers
The conservative system would be expected to reduce the number of collisions that
occur, but would also increase the number of unnecessary alerts. In contrast, the critical
system would lower the unnecessary alert rate but may allow more accidents to occur.
6.4 Evaluation of Alerting Logic Variations
The concept described above was implemented in a preliminary fashion to assess the pre-
dicted performance variations. To do this, alerting thresholds were established for three
different avoidance maneuvers:
1. Turn and climb maneuver (described earlier).
2. Level turn maneuver (described earlier).
3. Straight-ahead climb maneuver (0.25g pull-up to a 2000 ft/min climb rate--no head-
ing change).
Each maneuver probability contour was assumed to lie centered on the collision curve and
was assumed to be 1600 ft wide in the longitudinal direction. For each maneuver, a new
range limit array was developed. These are included in Appendix A.
For the purpose of the evaluations, three systems were investigated: a conservative
system, a semi-critical system, and a critical system. For the conservative system, alerts
are issued when any one of the three thresholds is crossed. For the semi-critical system,
two thresholds are crossed before the alert is issued. In the critical system, all of the
thresholds must be crossed before the alert is finally issued.
To simplify the development of the logic and the choice of avoidance maneuver, the
evaluations were run under two-dimensional conditions. The selected avoidance maneu-
ver was chosen to have the smallest range limit value. The results of this evaluation are
included in Table 6.3. As in the two-dimensional performance evaluation, the total num-
ber of simulations is 42,822.
Table 6.3: Effect of Alerting Logic on Performance
Correct Missed Unnecessary Induced Correct
Rejection Detection Alert Collision Detection
Conservative 8.9x10-' 0.0 7.7x10 -2  9.3x10 -5  3.4x10 -2  0.0
Semi-Critical 9.2x 10-1 0.0 4.4x10 -2  1.6x10 -4  3.4x10 -2  0.0
Critical 9.3x10-' 0.0 3.4x10 -2  7.0x10 - 5  3.4x10 -2  0.0
As predicted, the unnecessary alert rate declines as more thresholds must be crossed
before an alert is issued. In fact, the conservative system issues alerts during normal
approaches because the alerting threshold had expanded. The overall rate of unnecessary
alerts during normal approaches was 2.4x10 -2. Ninety-three percent of these unnecessary
alerts occurred when the runways were spaced by only 1700 ft, with the remainder occur-
ring when the runways were spaced by 2500 ft. This indicates that the conservative sys-
tem would not be appropriate for a runway spacing of 1700 ft, and may not even be
suitable for a runway spacing of 2500 ft.
The rates of late alerts are zero for each logic evaluated, and the rates of induced colli-
sions are similar.
The hazard level present in each version of the alerting logic was calculated from the
performance data above. These results are included in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Alerting Logic Hazard Levels
Alerting Logic Hazard Level G
Conservative 0.0008 0.0004
Semi-Critical 0.0021 0.0008
Critical 0.0010 0.0006
The hazard level associated with the conservative alerting logic is lower than for the
other two because of the high number of unnecessary alerts which were issued. The sig-
nificantly higher hazard level associated with the semi-critical system is due to a small
increase in the number of induced collisions combined with a decrease in the number of
unnecessary alerts. Further work is needed to determine why a greater number of induced
collisions occurred under the semi-critical alerting system.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
A probability-based alerting logic for aircraft on parallel approach was designed and
tested. Monte Carlo simulations were used to calculate the probability of a collision over
an extensive range of possible parallel approach geometries. Based on the results, alerting
thresholds were established such that alerts are issued when the probability of a collision
exceeds a maximum acceptable hazard level.
Direct incorporation of probability into the alerting logic is a novel approach to alert-
ing system development. It allows explicit trade-offs to be made between safety and util-
ity, and it eliminates the guesswork involved in defining an alerting threshold based solely
on fixed physical parameters. It enables the logic to be designed to provide a consistent
level of safety over a range of possible situations.
Several modifications were made to a baseline two-dimensional version of the alerting
logic. First, altitude considerations were added in order to expand the situations under
which the logic could operate effectively. Also, the logic was redesigned to select one of
several avoidance maneuver options. Performance evaluations were made of all versions
of the logic. The evaluation procedure used pilot-flown blunder trajectories recorded dur-
ing a simulator study at Rockwell-Collins. When appropriate, the logic issued alerts based
on 'real-time' state measurements and an avoidance maneuver was initiated in response to
those alerts. The eventual outcome of each approach was then categorized to allow an
analysis of performance.
7.1 Summary of Significant Results
Two-Dimensional Logic
The two-dimensional logic consists of two alerting criteria: 1) the intruder must be
within a range limit which is dependent on the intruder's state measurements, and 2) the
intruder must be in a position from which a collision is likely if a constant-rate turn trajec-
tory is followed. No allowance is made for climb rates or altitude separation.
The overall performance delivered by the two-dimensional logic under two-dimen-
sional approaches (aircraft are coaltitude) is approximately equal to the level of perfor-
mance that the system was designed to achieve. The hazard level goal was set at 0.001
and the system exhibited an overall hazard level of 0.004, which is similar to the PRM
level. This hazard level implies that approximately one in 250 blunders will not be
resolved by the alerting system.
The performance of the alerting logic indicates that it may be successful in providing
protection for parallel approaches to runways spaced less than 3400 ft apart. When the
intruder followed a normal approach course at runway separations ranging from 1700 ft to
3400 ft, no alerts were ever issued. This may indicate that the alerting thresholds can be
expanded, providing additional safety while maintaining an acceptable rate of unnecessary
alerts.
Two types of blunders (the 50 bank angle blunder and the 10' heading change blunder)
were found to cause collisions under two-dimensional approaches. A modification to the
logic is proposed which should greatly improve performance under these blunder scenar-
ios.
Three-Dimensional Logic
Two separate enhancements were made to the two-dimensional logic in order to
improve performance under three-dimensional approach geometries. One version of the
three-dimensional logic issues alerts based on predicted altitude separation if the own air-
craft follows the normal approach path (Normal Approach criterion). The other version
issues alerts based on predicted altitude separation if the own aircraft initiates an avoid-
ance maneuver (Avoidance Maneuver criterion).
Performance evaluations were made of the two-dimensional logic and both versions of
three-dimensional logic under three-dimensional parallel approach geometries. The Nor-
mal Approach criterion lowered the unnecessary alert rate by forty-six percent but allowed
a slight increase in the rate of induced collisions. The Avoidance Maneuver criterion
issued a slightly higher rate of unnecessary alerts than the Normal Approach criterion but
lowered the induced collision rate below the level allowed by the two-dimensional logic.
Performance evaluations were made of an alerting logic which chooses among several
maneuvers. First, a level turn option was added to the alerting logic, for a total of two
maneuver options. Expected performance improvements were not realized, largely
because of the induced collisions which occurred when the level turn maneuver was
selected. Second, additional maneuver options allow the development of several alerting
systems which range from conservative (alert when one avoidance maneuver becomes
unacceptably risky) to critical (alert when all but one maneuver becomes unacceptably
risky). Evaluations of such a series of alerting systems shows that the conservative system
issues almost twice as many unnecessary alerts without a commensurate increase in safety.
7.2 Areas for Future Work
A number of issues arose which demand further investigation but were beyond the scope
of this initial study.
Error Estimates
The statistics which establish error estimates are crucial to the successful attainment of
a performance goal. Alerting thresholds were defined based on probability values calcu-
lated using Monte Carlo simulations. The validity of such calculations, and thus the accu-
racy of the alerting thresholds, depends on accurate state measurement error distributions.
This version of the logic estimated ,x and (y based on DGPS position measurements.
Estimates of (T and (T were designed to encompass several different uncertainties within
the system: measurement error, variations caused by disturbances such as wind conditions
during the approach, and the ability of the intruder to perform a maneuver which differs
from the assumed constant-rate turn. Better estimates of uncertainty will enable to result-
ing performance calculations to more closely conform to the design goals. Data being col-
lected by MIT Lincoln Laboratory at Memphis International Airport may help define more
realistic probability density functions [10].
A few significant error measurements were excluded from the development of this
logic due to the difficulty in estimating their magnitudes. Variations in the pilot's response
time were ignored, as well as any variation in the pilot's aggressiveness while performing
a prescribed avoidance maneuver. Both of these parameters are important, but experimen-
tal measurements are difficult because of possible learning effects when subjects are
exposed to more than one alert.
Definition of a Collision
The development and predicted performance of the alerting logic depends greatly on
the definition of a collision which is used. During both the development of the alerting
logic and during subsequent performance evaluations, a collision was defined as a miss
distance of 500 ft or less.
It may be useful to design the alerting logic to provide a minimum separation of 500 ft
but classify scenario outcomes into several categories. For instance, miss distances less
than 500 ft would still be collisions. Scenarios in which an alert was issued but the mini-
mum miss distance was between 500 ft and 1000 ft would be termed near misses. Unnec-
essary alerts would comprise scenarios in which an alert was issued but the miss distance
was greater than 1000 ft. Of course, these numerical definitions could be changed. Creat-
ing this additional category in which to place a scenario's outcome would allow more
accurate analysis of the alerting system's performance.
Induced Collisions
Induced collisions accounted for a significant portion of the accidents allowed by the
alerting logic. A significant fraction of these occurred during scenarios in which the alert
was issued after the intruder had already crossed the own aircraft's runway centerline. A
number of options exist to eliminate these accidents: the alerting logic can be modified or
additional maneuvers can be permitted.
First, the alerting logic can be modified such that two separate components exist. One
component would operate under normal situations; the other component would become
active when the intruder crossed the own aircraft's runway centerline. Both components
would be developed using the same probability-based method outlined in this thesis.
A second option involves using the same logic but allowing a different maneuver
when the intruder crosses the own aircraft's runway centerline. The induced collision is a
direct result of the own aircraft turning toward the intruder. If the direction of turn were
reversed, the collision would not occur. However, the own aircraft would be turning
toward the parallel stream of aircraft, creating other potential conflicts not considered by
the alerting logic.
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Appendix A
Range Limit Arrays
The alerting logic relies on the arrays included in this appendix for a physical parameter
which defines the alerting threshold. This parameter changes as the situation changes and
as the planned avoidance maneuver changes. Therefore, each of the following tables con-
tains range limits for various intruder headings, bank angles, and airspeeds. Also, each
possible avoidance maneuver discussed in the text has a corresponding array.
Note that the heading associated with each range limit value is listed to the left of each
row. Also, the bank angle is listed across the top and the intruder's airspeed is noted prior
to each nine-by-seven array.
Table
Intruder Airspeed:
-200
-400 800
-300 800
-200 800
-100 800
00 800
100 800
200 800
300 923
400 1256
Intruder Airspeed:
-200
-400 800
-300 800
-200 800
-100 800
00 800
100 800
1: Range Limit Array for Turn and Climb Maneuver
120 knots
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
1095
1555
2040
140 knots
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
00
800
800
800
800
800
1344
1687
1919
2196
00
800
800
800
800
800
1137
100
800
800
800
1081
1341
1644
1917
2169
2421
100
800
800
800
800
1095
1464
200
800
1076
1196
1435
1707
1943
2206
2424
2695
200
800
800
800
1103
1462
1801
300
1302
1447
1637
1822
2029
2217
2481
2728
2938
300
800
956
1230
1550
1802
2069
400
1775
1842
2015
2159
2273
2488
2815
3013
3330
400
1341
1545
1724
1956
2186
2482
20
300
400
800
800
800
Intruder Airspeed:
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
846
1455
Intruder Airspeed:
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
955
1255
1887
800
800
1927
1512
1873
2212
1802
2156
2470
2110
2417
2738
160 knots
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
1571
2026
00
800
800
800
800
800
1080
1502
1913
2332
100
800
800
800
800
1017
1433
1849
2257
2604
200
800
800
800
965
1379
1774
2168
2510
2923
180 knots
-100
800
800
800
800
800
1066
1410
1831
2280
00
800
800
800
800
800
1363
1730
2165
2632
100
800
800
800
800
1271
1635
2059
2472
2917
200
800
800
1040
1192
1536
1931
2321
2758
3151
Table 2: Range Limit Array for Climb Maneuver
Intruder Airspeed: 120 knots
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
923
1342
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
1132
1518
2335
00
800
800
800
800
800
1679
2776
2923
3134
100
800
800
800
1856
2482
2746
2963
3215
3483
200
800
1722
2359
2608
2808
3061
3286
3600
3912
102
2410
2711
3090
2757
3106
3357
300
800
800
1002
1403
1719
2118
2414
2853
3214
400
877
1189
1504
1785
2076
2421
2797
3187
3610
300
800
865
1090
1437
1843
2207
2635
3019
3515
400
800
1093
1438
1777
2174
2583
2954
3436
3851
300
2483
2650
2837
2985
3234
3462
3746
3936
4192
400
2885
3006
3234
3415
3673
3880
4106
4289
4326
Intruder Airspeed:
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
140 knots
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
1638
Intruder Airspeed: 160 knots
-400
-30o
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
851
1449
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
1753
2541
Intruder Airspeed: 180 knots
-400
-300
-20o
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
955
1250
1968
-100
800
800
800
800
800
1066
1474
2150
2897
Table 3: Range Limit Array for Level Turn Maneuver
Intruder Airspeed: 120 knots
-400
-300
-200
-200
800
800
800
-100
800
800
800
00
800
800
800
100
800
800
800
200
1454
1358
1432
300
1615
1707
1838
103
00
800
800
800
800
800
1968
2268
2653
3102
100
800
800
800
1679
2047
2376
2758
3203
3622
200
940
1581
1943
2233
2548
2886
3295
3672
4089
300
2057
2298
2487
2772
3068
3409
3786
4074
4401
400
2670
2802
3019
3339
3593
3922
4163
4351
4576
00
800
800
800
800
800
1304
1988
2636
3271
100
800
800
800
996
1537
2142
2736
3313
3842
200
800
854
1320
1798
2300
2804
3380
3875
4242
300
1463
1806
2141
2506
3014
3461
3937
4286
4663
400
2265
2513
2850
3225
3575
4013
4360
4578
4864
00
800
800
800
800
800
1544
2216
2943
3616
100
800
800
800
1205
1581
2250
2968
3594
4216
200
800
800
1170
1664
2303
3001
3585
4188
4600
300
917
1318
1878
2512
3099
3637
4178
4579
4903
400
1825
2269
2738
3237
3783
4181
4601
4867
5158
400
1989
2091
2225
-100
00
100
200
300
400
800
800
800
800
923
1395
800
800
800
1132
1708
2203
Intruder Airspeed: 140 knots
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
829
2043
Intruder Airspeed: 160 knots
-400
-30o
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-200
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
849
1455
-100
800
800
800
800
800
800
845
1645
2177
Intruder Airspeed: 180 knots
-400
-300
-200
-100
00
100
200
300
400
-20o
800
800
800
800
800
800
955
1273
1962
-100
800
800
800
800
800
1066
1654
2627
4005
800
800
1587
1807
2081
2367
1276
1569
1849
2112
2361
2634
1634
1878
2119
2359
2675
2980
2001
2189
2472
2698
3039
3301
2352
2595
2829
3172
3542
3924
00
800
800
800
800
800
1241
1634
2018
2379
100
800
800
800
800
1189
1586
1969
2360
2701
200
800
800
908
1310
1628
1987
2282
2675
3031
300
944
1208
1464
1718
2036
2332
2696
3033
3481
400
1544
1697
1917
2150
2361
2736
3117
3548
4140
00
800
800
800
800
800
1149
1642
2131
2660
100
800
800
800
800
1169
1601
2041
2524
3227
200
800
800
800
1142
1559
1975
2418
2886
3601
300
800
810
1229
1564
1934
2357
2823
3362
3972
400
1127
1352
1698
2013
2361
2750
3267
3924
4624
00
800
800
800
800
800
4204
5535
7020
8591
100
800
800
800
800
2567
4657
7285
9629
12386
200
800
800
1304
1759
2587
4181
7339
8565
9717
300
800
1009
1367
1837
2563
3398
4134
5039
5550
400
924
1250
1675
2111
2628
3263
4003
4820
5595
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Appendix B
Alerting Logic in Pseudocode
The alerting logic was originally written in C code. What follows is a generalized version
of that original code with comments signifying the processing which is occurring. The
variables which appear as text are defined similarly to those which appear in the body of
this thesis.
/* intruder between runways?
/* preserve signs of
/* heading & bank angle
else {
psi = (-l)*psi;
phi = (-l)*phi;
t = 0;
y_curve = 0;
rangelimit = find_max_range();
range = sqrt(x*x+y*y);
if (range < rangelimit) {
if (fabs(phi) < 0.001) {
if (psi < 0.0);
hit = FALSE;
t = x/(v*sin(psi));
y_curve = vown*t - v*cos(psi)
/* Otherwise, change signs */
/* find range limit from table */
/* compute intruder's actual range */
/* within range? */
/* for turn rates close to zero */
/* and small heading deviation */
/* set hit flag to false */
/* compute tc */
*t; /* determine Ycurve */
else { /* for non-zero turn rates
r = (v*v/(32.2*tan(phi))); /* compute turn radius
if (phi > 0.0 && x > (r + r*cos(psi))) { /* small radius?
hit = FALSE; /* set hit flag to false
else if (phi < 0.0 && x > (-r+r*cos(psi))) { /* banked away?
hit = FALSE; /* then set hit flag to false
else { /* Otherwise
if ((psi>0.0) I (phi>0.0)) { /* If heading or bank positive
psidot = v/r; /* compute rate of heading change
t = (acos(-x/r + cos(psi)) - psi)/psidot; /* compute tc
y_curve = vown*t - r*(sin(psidot*t + psi) - sin(psi));
I
else /* Otherwise, attitude is away from own aircraft */
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if (x > 0.0) {
psi = psi;
phi = phi;
hit = FALSE;
}
if (fabs(y - y_curve) <= 800 ft)
hit = TRUE;
else
hit = FALSE;
if (hit == TRUE) {
}
/* set hit flag to false */
/* check distance to */
/* collision curve */
/* if two conditions are satisfied, issue alert */
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